















KURT R. BREKKE 
LUIGI SICILIANI 
ODD RUNE STRAUME 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2124 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










This paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type 
model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and 
two types of patients; high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals 
(competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand 
treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of 
monopoly, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if 
the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, 
the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower 
travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while 
the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive 
segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the 
(regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high. 
JEL Code: H42, I11, I18, L13. 
Keywords: hospitals, competition, waiting times. 
 
Kurt R. Brekke 
Department of Economics and Health 
Economics Bergen 
Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration 
Helleveien 30 
Norway - 5045 Bergen 
kurt.brekke@nhh.no 
Luigi Siciliani 
Department of Economics and Centre for 
Health Economics 
University of York, Heslington 




Odd Rune Straume 
Department of Economics and NIPE 
University of Minho 
Campus de Gualtar 
Portugal - 4710-057 Braga 
o.r.straume@eeg.uminho.pt 
  
October 2, 2007 
We thank seminar participants at University of Bergen, Helsinki Centre of Economic 
Research, University of Porto, New University of Lisbon and Carnegie Mellon University, 
and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 Introduction
Waiting times are a major health policy concern in many OECD countries. Mean waiting
times for non-emergency care are above three months in several countries and maximum
waiting times can stretch into years. Policymakers often argue that more competition and
patient choice can reduce waiting times by encouraging hospitals to compete for patients
and revenues (Siciliani and Hurst, 2004, 2005).1 The mechanisms of how this may work
are, however, not very clear. Why would hospitals that operate at full capacity and face
excessive demand have an incentive to compete for even more patients? The main purpose
of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between competition
and waiting times in hospital markets.
We develop a model of hospital competition within a Salop framework, where hospitals
diﬀer in terms of (geographical) location and, possibly, waiting times. We assume that
there are two types of patients who diﬀer in expected beneﬁt ("high" and "low") from
hospital treatment. Hospitals compete on the segment of demand with high beneﬁt, while
they are local monopolists on the demand segment with low beneﬁt. By comparing with
a benchmark case of monopoly, we analyse how the introduction of competition in the
hospital market aﬀects waiting time and activity in equilibrium. Given a policy regime
of hospital competition, we also examine the eﬀects of increasing the degree of competi-
tion, based on three diﬀerent measures: (i) patients’ travelling costs, (ii) the size of the
competitive relative to the monopolistic demand segment, and (iii) hospital density (the
number of hospitals). We also derive the socially optimal waiting time and assess the
welfare implications of hospital competition.
Most of the existing literature assumes that hospitals are local monopolists (Lindsay
and Feigenbaum, 1984; Iversen, 1993, 1997; Martin and Smith, 1999; Olivella, 2002; Barros
1There are many examples. Norway introduced activity-based funding (DRG-pricing) in 1997 and
nation-wide patient choice of hospital in 2001. Both reforms aimed at stimulating competition and reducing
waiting times. In the United Kingdom, the policy Payment by Results has been recently introduced, which
remunerates hospitals according to a ﬁxed tariﬀ per patient treated. One of the objectives of the policy is
to induce hospitals to compete for resources by reducing waiting times. In Denmark patients have had free
choice of treatment in any publicly-funded hospital within the county of residence since 1993. In Sweden
since 2002 all county councils have introduced free choice among public providers within and between
counties.
2and Olivella, 2005; see Cullis et al., 2000, for a review of the literature). Two exceptions
are Xavier (2003) and Siciliani (2005) who model competition within a Hotelling frame-
w o r ka n di nad u o p o l ym o d e lw i t hd i ﬀerentiated products, respectively.2 In these models,
competition takes the form of duopoly, with the degree of competition being measured by
the substitutability between treatments at the two hospitals, and both ﬁnd that increased
competition (or increased patient choice) leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium.
An arguable limitation of both these studies is that the analysis of a potential competi-
tion eﬀect is conﬁned to a single competition measure that leaves considerable room for
interpretation. Furthermore, the lack of a welfare analysis leaves the more fundamental
question of whether hospital competition is desirable in the ﬁrst place, unanswered.
In the present paper, we complement and extend these studies in several diﬀerent ways.
First, we isolate a pure competition eﬀect by considering monopoly versus competition,
something which has not been done in the previous literature on hospital competition
and waiting times. Second, the richness of our model allows us to use several diﬀerent
measures of the degree of hospital competition, something that turns out to have a crucial
impact with respect to both waiting times and activity levels. Third, we include a welfare
analysis where we derive and characterise both the socially optimal waiting time and the
optimal treatment price, and analyse under which circumstances hospital competition is
socially desirable in a public hospital market. We also deviate from the above mentioned
studies by explicitly modelling semi-altruistic health care providers.
We ﬁnd that introducing competition, by allowing previous local monopolies to com-
pete for patients (equivalently, to introduce free patient choice), leads to an increase in
equilibrium waiting times (with a corresponding reduction in hospital activity) only if
the competitive demand segment is suﬃciently large relative to the monopoly segment,
and vice versa.3 Thus, we obtain the previously derived result in the literature as a spe-
2Another related paper is Dawson et al. (2007) who analyse the impact of introducing patient choice
on hospital waiting times. They ﬁnd that the eﬀect of choice on waiting times depends on the demand
elasticities. Their model is, however, very diﬀerent from ours, as they focus solely on the demand-side,
assuming the supply-side to be completely exogenous. Thus, hospital competition is not an issue in their
paper at all.
3The impact of patient choice on hospital waiting times has received surprisingly little empirical atten-
tion. Two notable exceptions are: Dawson et al. (2007) who analyse the impact of the London Patient
3cial case: when the competitive segment tends to one then competition always increases
waiting times. Also, given a competition regime, we ﬁnd that increasing the degree of
competition has ambiguous eﬀects on waiting times, depending on the measure of com-
petition. Lower travelling costs for patients increase waiting times, which replicates the
result derived by Xavier (2003). In addition, we ﬁnd that a larger competitive segment
has an indeterminate eﬀect, while higher hospital density reduces waiting times.
Furthermore, the relationship between competition and hospital activity is often counter-
intuitive. For example, lower travelling costs, which — all else equal — increase demand for
hospital treatment, lead in equilibrium to lower hospital activity due to the correspond-
ing increase in waiting time. Similarly, higher hospital density, which — all else equal —
reduces demand per hospital, leads in equilibrium to higher per hospital activity due to
the corresponding reduction in waiting time.
Regarding social welfare, we show that, if the competitive demand segment is relatively
large, hospital competition is socially desirable only if the (regulated) price per treatment
is suﬃciently high. For a small competitive demand segment, the result is reversed; in
this case, competition is desirable only if the treatment price is suﬃciently low.
However, the socially optimal waiting time is attainable through optimal price setting,
regardless of market regime. We also characterise the socially optimal treatment price and
show that whether high-powered incentive schemes substitute or complement competition
depends on the measure of competition. Unless the opportunity cost of public funds
or altruism is very high, stronger competition through higher hospital density increases
the optimal treatment price, while increased competition through lower travelling costs
reduces optimal prices.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section
2, while, in Section 3, we derive and characterise the equilibrium waiting time. The
eﬀects on waiting time and hospital activity of, ﬁrst, introducing competition, and, second,
increasing the degree of competition, are analysed in Section 4. In Section 5 we derive and
Choice Project, ﬁnding that the project led to shorter (and converging) average waiting times in the Lon-
don region; Siciliani and Martin (2007) who provide empirical evidence supporting a negative relationship
between hospital density and waiting times, for a given level of need.
4characterise both the socially optimal waiting time and the optimal treatment price, and
we assess the social desirability of introducing competition in a public hospital market. In
Section 6 we extend the analysis in two ways: ﬁrst, we introduce a copayment; second, we
allow for inequality aversion. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
The basic model builds on the original formulation of rationing by waiting time of Lindsay
and Feigenbaum (1984).4 The main assumptions are that (i) patients diﬀer in gross valua-
tion of (inherent beneﬁt from) medical treatment (due to, e.g., age, gender, illness severity,
opportunity costs); (ii) delay of treatment due to waiting time reduces patients’ beneﬁt;
and (iii) patients face costs related to obtaining treatment, including any costs related to
examinations, referrals and, importantly, travelling. All patients with a non-negative net
beneﬁt from medical treatment demand care by joining the waiting list. A higher waiting
time lowers patients’ beneﬁt, inducing patients with a low valuation (e.g., old patients or
patients with mild conditions) to renounce medical treatment.5,6
To analyse the impact of competition on waiting times, we need to extend the basic
model to more than one single provider. As a consequence, patients are not just deciding
whether or not to demand medical treatment, but also which provider to demand treatment
from. Using the framework of Salop (1979), we consider a market for elective hospital
treatment where n hospitals are equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal
to 1. In this market there are two patient types — L and H —d i ﬀering with respect to
the gross valuation of treatment. Both types are uniformly distributed on the circle. A
patient demands either one treatment from the most preferred hospital, or no treatment
4See also the theory section in Martin and Smith (1999) and Farnworth (2003).
5Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) provide empirical evidence showing that higher waiting time ration
demand. This is later conﬁrmed by more robust empirical studies by Martin and Smith (1999) and Martin
et al. (2007) who show, after controlling for the supply of private beds, that demand for hospital treatment
is (weakly) elastic to waiting time.
6T h ep r e s e n c eo fp r i v a t eh o s p i t a l so rc l i n i c so ﬀering instant treatment might be an additional reason
for waiting time to have a rationing eﬀect on demand as rich patients might opt for the private alternative.
A brief analysis of this aspect can be found in Brekke et al. (2007). Besley et al. (1999) provide empirical
evidence showing that higher waiting times increase demand for private health insurance in the UK.
5at all. The utility of an H-type patient who is located at x and seeking treatment at
hospital i, located at zi,i sg i v e nb y 7
UH (x,zi)=V − kwi − t|x − zi|, (1)
where V is the gross valuation of (instant) medical treatment for the H-type patient, wi
is the waiting time at hospital i, k is a parameter measuring the (marginal) disutility of
d e l a yo ft r e a t m e n t ,a n dt is a travelling cost parameter.8
Equivalently, the utility of a L-type patient who is located at x and seeking treatment
at hospital i, located at zi,i sg i v e nb y
UL (x,zi)=v − kwi − t|x − zi|, (2)
where V> v .D i ﬀerence in gross valuations across patients can be due to diﬀerence in
age, gender, illness severity, or simply opportunity costs. For example, old patients with
a non-severe condition might have a low valuation of medical treatment.
Travel costs are interpreted broadly and include all costs associated with being far
from "home", not just the patients’ travelling expenditures. For example, choosing a
distant hospital may involve rather high travel and accommodation costs for family and
relatives. In addition, distance might also involve non-pecuniary costs to patients due to,
for instance, the possibility of less (or no) visits or simply discomfort of being far from
home. Finally, for patients living in rural areas, travelling distances might actually be
7In Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) the beneﬁt from a treatment received after a wait of w has a present
value of v · e
−rw, where the gross valuation v varies across patients. The extension of their model to n
hospitals, forces us to use a linear discount function rather than an exponential one. This assumption
makes the model more simple without qualitatively aﬀecting the results. As pointed out by Gravelle and
Siciliani (2007), empirical evidence suggests that many individuals do not use exponential discounting of
health, but instead use a variety of discounting functions, including hyperbolic discounting. Thus, linear
discounting might in many cases be a good approximation.
8To make the analysis feasible and focused, we ignore hospital quality of care as a variable. As pointed
out by an anonymous referee, there are clear parallels between waiting times and more generally quality
of care, as waiting times can be interpreted as a negative form of hospital quality. However, there are also
important diﬀerences, the main diﬀerence being that while increasing quality for the provider is costly,
reducing waiting times is not. More precisely, increasing quality increases costs directly and also indirectly
through a higher demand. In contrast, reducing waiting times increases demand only.
6quite long, implying rather high travel expenditures.9
The parameter k measures the marginal disutility of waiting (∂U/∂wi = −k),a n dc a n
be thought of reﬂecting, for instance, illness severity. A high k implies a serious utility loss
associated with delay of treatment. Without loss of generality, we normalise the marginal
disutility to one, i.e., k =1 . This implies that we can interpret t as the marginal disutility
of travelling relative to waiting. Thus, a low t means that delay in treatment is of relatively
more importance to the patient than travelling distance (both measured as disutility in
monetary terms).10
We concentrate on cases where the H-segment is always covered, while the L-segment
is only partially covered. This implies that patients with a high gross valuation (H-types)
decide which hospital to demand treatment from, while patients with a low gross valuation
(L-types) decide whether or not to join the waiting list of the closest hospital. That is,
some L-patients will not seek treatment in equilibrium, as in Lindsay and Feigenbaum
(1984). We assume that the H-segment constitutes a share λ of the total number of
patients, which is normalised to 1.
Since the distance between hospitals is equal to 1/n,t h eH-patient who is indiﬀerent
between seeking treatment at hospital i and hospital j is located at xH
i ,g i v e nb y
V − txH



















Total demand for hospital i from the H-segment is given by XH
i =2 xH
i .
L-patients seek treatment only at the nearest hospital, if at all. The L-patient who is
9There is strong empirical evidence showing that distance is a major predictor of patients’ choice of
hospital, see, e.g., Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003).
10A recent paper by Monstad et al. (2006) measures the marginal substitution rate between waiting
t i m ea n dd i s t a n c ef o rh i pr e p l a c e m e n t si nN o r w a y .T h e yﬁnd that patients are not willing to travel far in
order to obtain quicker treatment. In light of our model, this suggests that t is quite high.
7indiﬀerent between treatment at hospital i and no treatment is located at xL
i ,g i v e nb y
v − txL







Total demand for hospital i from the L-segment is given by XL
i =2 xL
i . A necessary
assumption for waiting time to have a rationing eﬀect on demand is that the L-segment
is not fully covered, i.e., xL
i < 1/n,w h i c hi st h ec a s ei fa n do n l yi ft>(v − wi)/n.W e
will later derive the conditions for this assumption to hold in equilibrium.
Total demand facing hospital i from both segments is thus given by
XD
i = λXH
i +( 1− λ)XL
i =












, while total demand is given by XD :=
Pn
i=1 XD
i ∈ (λ,1). To gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of the model, it is
useful to see how demand reacts to changes in waiting times at the hospital level. From








Notice that lower travelling costs makes it less costly for patients to demand treatment,
or to switch between hospitals; this increases the demand responsiveness to changes in
waiting times. However, since the demand loss due to increased waiting time is larger in
the L-segment, a larger competitive segment (i.e., an increase in λ) will reduce the demand
responsiveness to changes in waiting times.
Hospitals are prospectively ﬁnanced by a public payer oﬀering a lump-sum transfer T
and a per-treatment price p. The objective function of hospital i is assumed to be given
by
πi = T + pXS







i is the supply of hospital treatments. Apart from ﬁxed hospital costs, F,t h e
cost of supplying hospital treatments is given by an increasing and strictly convex cost
function C (·). The convexity of the cost function captures an important feature in the
context of waiting times, namely that hospitals face some capacity constraints.11 The
function Bi (·) gives the beneﬁt of the patients from receiving treatment at hospital i,
while the parameter α ∈ [0,1] captures the degree of altruism of the provider.12 More
explicitly, the surplus to patients treated at hospital i is given by










(v − wi − tx)dx,
where the ﬁrst term is the surplus to H-type patients, and the second term is the surplus
to the L-type patients.
















A marginal reduction in the waiting time of hospital i has two eﬀects. First, it reduces
the waiting time, and thus increases utility, for all existing patients at hospital i.T h i si s
represented by the ﬁrst term in (9). Second, it increases demand for treatment at hospital
i. At the margin, the increased demand from the L-segment represents a zero utility
contribution. However, in the H-segment, there is an inﬂow of patients with a strictly
positive net utility of hospital treatment. This is represented by the second term in (9).
Obviously, the magnitude of this second eﬀect depends on the size of the competitive
segment, λ. Notice also that patient surplus at hospital i is a convex function of wi
11A convex variable cost function is supported by evidence suggesting that economies of scale are quite
rapidly exhausted in the hospital sector (see, e.g., Ferguson et al., 1999, and Folland et al., 2004, for
literature surveys).
12This formulation is consistent with Ellis and McGuire (1986), Chalkley and Malcomson (1998) and
Jack (2005). It is also general. The special case of a proﬁt-maximiser hospital can be obtained by setting
α =0 .
9(implying that the altruistic disutility of waiting (−αBi)i sc o n c a v ei nwi).13
3 Equilibrium waiting times
In deriving the equilibrium, we assume, as is commonly done, that waiting time acts as a
re-equilibrating mechanism between demand and supply, i.e., XD (wi,w j)=XS.14 This
implies that it is equivalent whether we maximise the hospital objective function with
respect to supply or waiting time. For analytical purposes, we use the latter approach.
Thus, the hospitals simultaneously and independently choose announced waiting times,
in order to maximise their objective functions. We assume that the hospitals are not
able/allowed to discriminate between diﬀerent patient types with respect to waiting times.
We also assume that hospitals cannot turn down patients seeking treatment. This latter
assumption implies that we do not allow for explicit rationing.
Recall that the investment in capacity is captured by the increasing marginal cost
assumption. Waiting times have a role precisely because in the absence of waiting times,
there would be excess demand. Suppose that waiting times are zero. Then demand is
equal to:
XD







The optimal supply for provider i is given by XS
i .I fXS
i >X D
i (wi =0 ) , then the optimal
waiting time is zero: there is no rationing and the hospital is able to provide instant
treatment to all the patients. However, if XS
i <X D
i (wi = wj =0 )there is excess demand
equal to XD
i (wi = wj =0 )− XS
i > 0. There are two possible interpretations for the
equilibrium condition XD (wi,w j)=XS.
The ﬁrst is that at each point in time, providers ration demand and choose a waiting
time high enough to bring the market in equilibrium: patients with lowest net beneﬁta r e
not willing to wait and disappear from the market. The equilibrium waiting time is such







14See Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), Gravelle et al. (2003), Iversen (1993, 1997), Martin and Smith
(1999) and Siciliani (2005).
10that the market always clears: XS
i = XD
i (wi,w j). This is the standard interpretation in
the literature starting from the seminal paper of Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), followed
more recently by Iversen (1993, 1997), Martin and Smith (1999), Olivella (2002), Barros
and Olivella (2005) and Siciliani (2005).
The second possible interpretation is that waiting time adjustment is sluggish. Patients
demanding treatment at any point in time t are added to the waiting list. The waiting
list increases over time if demand exceeds supply, and vice versa. Before being added to
the waiting list, each patient is told that they have to wait a time equal to wi(t) to clear
the current waiting list. If the wait is too long some low-beneﬁt patients will give up the
treatment, and are not added to the waiting list. In Appendix A, we show that in the
steady state we still obtain the condition XS
i = XD
i (wi,w j).15
Substituting (5) into (7) and maximising (7) with respect to waiting time yields the





p − C0 (Xi (wi,w j))






w h i c hi m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁnes a best response function wi (wj). Notice that we have suppressed
the superscript on the demand function.16

















t − α λ
2t
> 0 (12)
If, say, ﬁrm j increases its waiting time, some (H-type) consumers switch to hospital i,
which now faces a higher demand. To meet this increase in demand, hospital i has to
15We could potentially analyse also the eﬀect of competition on waiting list as well as waiting time.
However, the main focus of policy makers is on waiting times rather than waiting lists (what matters to
patients is how long they have to wait, not how many patients are waiting on the list). Therefore, we do
not pursue this any further.














< 0, which is always satis-















17Applying the second-order condition reported in Footnote 16, it is straightforward to see that both the
numerator and the denominator are positive, since C
00 (·)(2− λ)/t > α is necessary (but not suﬃcient)
for the second-order condition to be fulﬁlled.
11increase its supply, but this would increase marginal costs, making the ﬁrst term in (11)
more positive, implying that ∂πi/∂wi > 0. Since the price is ﬁxed, we see from the ﬁrst-
order condition that the optimal response for hospital i to a higher wj, is to reduce demand
by increasing its waiting time, wi, until the level where ∂πi/∂wi =0 . Thus, waiting times
are strategic complements for competing hospitals.
In a symmetric equilibrium, wj = wi = w∗. Using (5) and (6), the equilibrium waiting




























and w∗ = w∗ (v,t,λ,α,p,n).18 Since the right-hand side of (13) is positive, the expression
in the square brackets on the left hand side of (13) is negative in an interior solution.19
Thus, the equilibrium waiting time is such that the (regulated) price is lower than the
marginal treatment cost. In other words, the marginal patient is ﬁnancially unproﬁtable
to treat for the hospital.
We want to focus on equilibria with strictly positive waiting times. This requires that
the cost of treating the last patient who demands treatment at w =0is larger than the
treatment price p. This requirement will be met if the supply cost function is suﬃciently
convex. Furthermore, we restrict attention to interior solutions with a partially covered







Proposition 1 Assume that the degree of altruism is suﬃciently small. Then there exists
18Uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium is conﬁr m e db yt h ep o s i t i v es i g no ft h eJ a c o b i a n :
∆ :=



































where the expression in the square brackets is positive whenever the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
19The term V −w
∗ −t/2n is the utility to the marginal H−type consumer in equilibrium, which is non-
negative due to the market coverage assumption of the competitive segment. Since the right-hand side of
(13) is positive, equilibrium waiting times are such that p<C
0 (·). The exact conditions for (13)-(14) to
constitute an interior equilibrium are provided in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.
12an equilibrium waiting time, implicitly deﬁned by (13), which is positive and involves a








































































The equilibrium waiting time is monotonically decreasing in the treatment price p.
All proofs, including the proof of the above proposition, are given in Appendix B.
The inverse relationship between equilibrium waiting times and the treatment price
is easily explained. A higher price simply means that the marginal patient becomes less
unproﬁtable to treat, which dampens the incentive to use waiting time as an instrument
to shift demand from unproﬁtable patients towards neighbouring hospitals.
Notice also that, since positive equilibrium waiting times imply that the marginal
patient is unproﬁtable for the hospitals to treat, the equilibrium is "undercutting proof",
in the sense that it is never proﬁtable for a hospital to deviate from the equilibrium by
reducing waiting times in order to drive neighbouring hospitals out of the market.
4 The impact of competition on waiting times and activity
We will now use the model to analyse if and how competition in hospital markets aﬀects
waiting times and hospital activity in equilibrium. The analysis is done in two steps. We
start out by considering the eﬀect of introducing competition in a hospital market char-
acterised by local monopolies. Subsequently, we consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent measures
to i n c r e a s et h ed e g r e eo fc o m p e t i t i o nin a hospital market where there is competition to
13begin with.
4.1 Introducing competition
Assume that the hospital market described in the previous section consists of local monop-
olies, where patients are allocated to hospitals purely according to geographical distance.
If a patient decides to visit a hospital to undergo treatment, she has to attend the near-
est hospital. In our model, this means that hospital i’s demand from the H-segment is
exogenously given by XH
i = 1









There is now a demand response to waiting time changes only in the L-segment. Diﬀer-








Comparing (6) and (16), we see that demand responsiveness is higher with competition.









(v − wi − tx)dx, (17)
where the ﬁrst term is the surplus to H-type patients, and the second term is the surplus





In the absence of competition, notice how the marginal reduction in patient surplus from
waiting is lower in absolute value (cf. (9)). The reason is that, under monopoly, changing
the waiting time has only an eﬀect on inframarginal patients.
Inserting (15) into the ﬁrst-order condition, (11), and applying symmetry, the equilib-





p − C0 (Xi (wm))
¤
= αXi (wm),i =1 ,2, (19)
where







Comparing (13) and (19) we see that, for w∗ = wm, both the left-hand side and the
right-hand side of (19) are smaller than the left-hand side and right-hand side of (13).
This means that wm ≶ w∗. A closer scrutiny of the two ﬁrst-order conditions enables us
to derive the following result:
Proposition 2 Introducing competition in a hospital market previously characterised by
local monopolies leads to longer (shorter) waiting times and lower (higher) activity in





There are two counteracting eﬀects that contribute to this result. First, ∂Xi/∂wi
increases in absolute value with the introduction of competition (see (6) and (16)). In
other words, introducing competition means that demand at each hospital becomes more
responsive to changes in the waiting time announced by the hospital, and the magnitude
of this eﬀect is increasing in λ. This is intuitive, since, without competition, only patients
in the L-segment respond to waiting times. So how does the magnitude of |∂Xi/∂wi| aﬀect
equilibrium waiting times? Remember that, with a hospital disutility of positive waiting
times (due to altruism), the marginal patient is unproﬁtable to treat. In equilibrium, this
ﬁnancial loss is optimally weighed against the disutility of increasing waiting times. When
hospital demand responds to waiting time changes in the competitive demand segment,
each hospital gets a stronger incentive to increase the waiting time, since this now becomes












15an instrument for shifting unproﬁtable patients to neighbouring hospitals.
However, there is also another eﬀect, related to the altruistic preferences of the hospi-
tals, that works in the opposite direction. Comparing (9) and (18) we see that the utility
gain of reduced waiting times is higher under hospital competition. With free patient
choice, a reduction in waiting times by hospital i attracts patients from neighbouring hos-
pitals who, due to altruism, contribute positively to the hospital objective function. All
else equal, this gives the hospitals incentives to reduce waiting times with the introduction
of competition.
Thus, the introduction of competition has two diﬀerent implications: on the one hand,
there is competition to avoid treating unproﬁtable patients, while, on the other hand, there
is "altruistic competition" to treat high-beneﬁt patients. Both of these eﬀects get stronger
when the relative size of the competitive segment increases. However this relationship
is more pronounced for the ﬁrst eﬀect. The reason is that, since treatment costs are
convex, while the altruistic disutility of waiting (−αBi)i sc o n c a v ei nwi, the higher level
of demand associated with a larger competitive segment means that competition to avoid
treating unproﬁtable patients becomes a more dominating force as λ increases. Thus,
competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if 1−λ< t
2n(V −v).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
w es e et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt and/or a reduction of n increase the parameter space for
which competition leads to longer waiting times. The reason is that higher travelling costs
and/or lower hospital density reduce the (altruistic) utility gain of reducing waiting times
under competition, as can be seen from (9).
It should be noted that the ambiguous nature of the competition eﬀect on equilibrium
waiting times is crucially dependent on the way altruism is modelled, where hospitals are
(partly) altruistic only toward their own patients. If instead hospitals cared equally about
all patients in the market, competition would not inﬂuence the eﬀect of waiting time
changes on the altruistic component in the hospital objective function.21 In this case,










16competition would unambiguously increase waiting times. Thus, the ﬁrst of the two above
discussed eﬀects — competition to avoid unproﬁtable patients — is, in some sense, a more
robust eﬀect.22
Finally, it is important to notice that introduction of competition does not aﬀect
demand per se; thus, changes in equilibrium waiting times are driven solely by strategic
competition eﬀects.
4.2 Increasing the degree of competition
Depending on interpretation, the eﬀect of increased competition (or increased patient
choice) on waiting times and activity can work through three diﬀerent parameters in the
model: t, λ and n. First, a reduction in travelling costs, t, will intensify competition
between hospitals in the competitive segment of the market. Second, competition will
also naturally increase if a larger share of the total market becomes competitive, i.e.,
if λ increases. One possible (outside-the-model) interpretation is a reduction in ﬁxed
costs of undergoing hospital treatment for some patients, implying that a larger share
of patients ﬁnd themselves in the competitive demand segment. Finally, the number of
hospitals in the market, n, is a standard measure of the degree of competition. Below we
present the comparative statics results with respect to the diﬀerent competition measures
on both waiting time and activity levels, obtained by total diﬀerentiation of (13), applying
Cramer’s rule.












(p − C0 (·)) 2−λ
t + αλ






t − α λ
2t
< 0, (21)
22It may also be the case that hospital managers care, to some extent, about all patients, but place a larger
altruistic weight on patients at their own hospitals. This intermediate case would weaken the "altruistic
competition" eﬀect, without eliminating it completely, increasing the likelihood that competition leads to




























t2 < 0.23,24 Lower travelling costs have two diﬀerent eﬀects on
the hospitals’ optimal choice of waiting times. First, there is a direct demand eﬀect, as
more patients in the L-segment will seek treatment. Each hospital will meet this demand
increase by increasing waiting times, and the strength of this response depends on the
additional costs of treating more patients relative to the altruistic disutility of longer
waiting times. Notice here that a higher level of demand also implies that the utility loss
of increasing the waiting time is larger, since there are more patients that need to wait
for treatment at hospital i. However, due to the convexity of treatment costs, the net
eﬀect is still positive with respect to waiting time. Second, lower travelling costs imply
that demand facing each hospital becomes more sensitive to changes in waiting times (see
(6)), which means that it becomes more eﬀective to use waiting times as an instrument
to shift unproﬁtable demand to neighbouring hospitals. Thus, both eﬀects contribute to
increased equilibrium waiting times as a result of lower travelling costs.
The eﬀect of lower travelling costs on equilibrium hospital activity is given by the sum
of a direct positive demand eﬀect and an indirect negative eﬀect through the increase in
equilibrium waiting time. We see from (22) that the total eﬀect is negative. It is perhaps
surprising that lower travelling costs lead to reduced activity in equilibrium. This can
be explained in the following way: since treatment costs are strictly convex, while the
disutility of waiting (due to altruism) is concave in wi, it is more costly for hospitals to
meet increased demand by increasing activity, relative to waiting times. Consequently, the
hospitals will meet a demand increase (induced by lower travelling costs) by increasing
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18waiting times until the level where the demand increase is completely oﬀset. However,
there is a second eﬀect of lower travelling costs, as explained above. The eﬀect on the
responsiveness of demand to waiting times implies that the hospitals have incentives to
increase demand even beyond the level where the initial demand increase is nulled out.
Thus, a reduction of travelling costs, which initially causes an increase in demand for hos-
pital treatments, will actually lead to lower activity in equilibrium, due to the equilibrium
response in waiting times.
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t ) > 0 since, in equilibrium, xH =1 /2n and xL =( v − w)/t, and,
by assumption, xL <x H.25
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of ∂w∗/∂λ is positive while the second and the third
are negative. Notice that even for a low degree of altruism, the eﬀect of λ on waiting time
is indeterminate. There are two oﬀsetting eﬀects that contribute to this ambiguity. Since
demand is higher from the competitive segment, a higher λ will increase total demand,
which — all else equal — contributes to longer waiting times. However, a larger H-segment
implies that demand becomes less responsive to changes in waiting times, as seen from
( 6 ) . T h i sm e a n st h a ti tb e c o m e sl e s se ﬀective to use waiting times to shift unproﬁtable
patients to neighbouring hospitals, which — all else equal — reduces equilibrium waiting
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19The eﬀect of a larger competitive segment on equilibrium activity is also indeterminate,
although clearly positive for suﬃciently low values of λ. The reason is that, for low values
of λ, the magnitude of the indirect eﬀect through changes in equilibrium waiting times
is relatively low, making the direct demand eﬀect the dominant one. The ﬁrst term in
the numerator of dX (w∗)/dλ is always positive. The second term is given by a weighted
average of the utility of a H-type patient and a L-type patient when receiving treatment
and located at x =1 /2n (by assumption this utility is positive for the H-type and negative
for the L-type). This term is consequently also positive if λ is suﬃciently low.
















































Notice that the signs of (25) and (26) are determined by applying the second-order con-
dition.26
Increased hospital density unambiguously reduces waiting times in equilibrium. The
intuition is quite simple. An increase in n means that — all else equal — each hospital
faces a lower demand from the competitive segment. This means, due to the convexity of
treatment costs, that the marginal treatment cost (for the last patient) is lower at each
hospital. Consequently, the marginal patient becomes less unproﬁtable to treat and the
hospitals will respond by reducing waiting times. Note that increased capacity, in itself, is
not enough to reduce waiting times, since the eﬀect on waiting times comes only through
the competitive segment, where increased capacity means lower demand for each hospital.
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20There are two eﬀects — one direct and one indirect — of an increase in n on the equi-
librium activity at the hospital level. Increased hospital density in the market means that
the number of patients treated per hospital from the competitive segment goes down.
However, there is an indirect "spillover" eﬀect from the competitive to the monopoly de-
mand segment. Due to the demand eﬀect in the competitive segment, resulting in shorter
waiting times, demand increases from the hospitals’ monopoly segments. Equation (26)
shows that the net eﬀect on demand is positive. In this case, the reduction in waiting
times fully compensates for the initial drop in demand. Total activity clearly increases
with hospital density, given that activity per hospital increases.
The eﬀects of increased hospital competition on waiting times and activity can be
summarised as follows:
Proposition 3 ( i )L o w e rt r a v e l l i n gc o s t si n c r e a s ew aiting times and decrease hospital
activity.
(ii) A larger competitive market segment has an indeterminate eﬀect on waiting times
and hospital activity. In general, the eﬀect on activity is positive if the competitive segment
is suﬃciently small.
(iii) Increased hospital density reduces waiting times and increases activity per hospital,
as well as total activity in the market.
5 Hospital competition and welfare
Having derived and characterised the equilibrium waiting time, we want to explore the
issue of whether competition leads to excessive or suboptimal levels of waiting time from
a social welfare perspective. To answer this question, we ﬁrst need to specify the welfare
function. We use the conventional measure of welfare as an unweighted sum of consumers’
and producers’ surplus. The welfare analysis is conducted at the hospital level; for total
welfare just multiply by n.
Since the model is symmetric, the socially optimal waiting time must be uniform across










(v − w − tx)dx, (28)
where the ﬁrst term is the surplus to H-type patients, and the second term is the surplus
to the L-type patients. Notice that we are assuming, as we did for the hospitals, that the
regulator cannot discriminate between patient types in terms of waiting time. The patient














Not very surprisingly, we see that the consumer surplus is always maximised at zero waiting
time.
Writing the social welfare function as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus
net of third-party payments, welfare at the hospital level is given by
W (w)=B (w)+T + pX (w) − C (X (w)) − F − (1 + γ)[pX (w)+T], (30)
where γ>0 is a positive constant denoting the opportunity cost of public funds.27 Since
it is costly for the regulator to fund hospital care, we assume that the lump-sum transfer
T is set such that the hospital’s participation constraint is binding. Adding the (realistic)
assumption that the provider also has a limited liability constraint, the transfer is set so
that pX + T = C (X)+F. The social welfare function then simpliﬁes to
W (w)=B (w) − (1 + γ)[C (X)+F]. (31)
27The altruistic component αB is not included in the welfare function as this would lead to double-
counting. As argued by Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), "There is a strong case for excluding this
benevolent component from social welfare on the grounds that benevolence represents a desire to do what
is in the social interest and, as such, should have no role in determining what the social interest is." See
also Hammond (1987) for further discussion. Notably, our results will not be qualitatively aﬀected by this
in any case.
225.1 The socially optimal waiting time
The socially optimal waiting time is obtained by maximising welfare with respect to waiting










which states that waiting time is socially optimised at a level where the utility loss to
patients from a marginal increase in waiting time is equal to the corresponding reduction
of treatment costs.
Using (14) and (29), and rearranging (32), we can write the expression for the socially
optimal waiting time, denoted by ws,a sf o l l o w s :





















and ws = ws (v,t,λ,n).
Equation (33) deﬁnes an interior solution for the socially optimal waiting time with a





.P r o p o s i t i o n4b e l o wp r o v i d e s
the exact conditions needed to support this equilibrium:
Proposition 4 There exists a socially optimal waiting time, ws,i m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁned by

















































We see that a positive socially optimal waiting time with a partially covered L-segment
requires that the cost function C is suﬃciently convex. The socially optimal waiting time



















































The results can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The socially optimal waiting time is decreasing in hospital density and
travelling costs, and increasing in the opportunity cost of public funds. While the size of
the competitive demand segment has an indeterminate eﬀect, the degree of altruism has
no eﬀect on the socially optimal waiting time.
Intuitively, an extra provider reduces the demand for each hospital, which reduces the
socially optimal waiting time. An increase in travelling costs reduces the demand from
low-beneﬁt patients, which reduces the optimal waiting time. Also, higher travelling costs
reduce the responsiveness of demand to increases in waiting times, and therefore reduces
24the eﬀectiveness of waiting times in bringing in equilibrium the demand and supply of
treatments, which reduces the optimal waiting times. For both reasons, waiting times
decrease in equilibrium when travelling costs go up.
An increase in the proportion of high-beneﬁt patients increases demand as high-beneﬁt
patients always demand treatment in equilibrium, while some low-beneﬁt patients do not.
This leads to a longer optimal waiting time. On the other hand, a higher proportion of
high-beneﬁt patients reduces the responsiveness of demand to increases in waiting times,
and therefore reduces the eﬀectiveness of waiting times as a re-equilibrating mechanism.
This reduces the optimal waiting times. Consequently, waiting times may increase or
decrease.
A higher opportunity cost of public funds naturally increases the socially optimal wait-
ing time, while the degree of altruism has no eﬀect. Since the limited-liability constraint is
binding, rather than the participation constraint, the degree of altruism does not inﬂuence
the socially optimal waiting time.
5.2 The socially optimal treatment price
The socially optimal waiting time can always be implemented by an appropriate choice of
p. This price, denoted by p∗, is such that29
p∗ = X (w∗)
t[λ +2 ( 1− λ)(1− α)]
2(1− λ)(2− λ)









Intuitively, the optimal price is higher when the marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in
waiting time is higher (−∂B
∂w = X), and it is lower when the degree of altruism α or the
opportunity cost of public funds γ is higher. The last term in (41) takes into account the
fact that the marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in waiting time in a competitive setting
(−
∂B(wi,wj)




the larger the diﬀerence between the two, the lower is the optimal price.
29The optimal price p
∗ maximises (31) so that: [∂B(w
∗)/∂w
∗ − (1 + γ)C
0 (·)(∂X(w)/∂w)]∂w
∗/∂p =





∗ = −2(1−λ)/t. Comparing the above with (11), the
result is obtained.
25The eﬀects of our diﬀerent competition measures on the optimal price can be derived
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T h er e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i s e da sf o l l o w s :
Proposition 6 If the degree of altruism or the opportunity cost of public funds is suﬃ-
ciently low, then a higher hospital density increases the optimal price while lower travelling
costs decrease the optimal price. A higher competitive segment has an indeterminate eﬀect
on the optimal price.
Since dX (w∗)/dn > 0, a higher hospital density increases activity and increases the so-
cial marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in waiting times and therefore increases the optimal
price. However a higher activity also increases the marginal cost, which induces a lower
price. Furthermore, a higher hospital density reduces waiting times and travelling costs,
increasing the marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in waiting time for the semi-altruistic
provider, which induces a lower price. Whenever the opportunity cost of public funds or
t h ed e g r e eo fa l t r u i s mi ss u ﬃciently low the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the optimal price
increases.
26Since dX (w∗)/dt > 0, lower travelling costs reduce activity and reduce the marginal
social beneﬁt from a reduction in waiting times and therefore reduces the optimal price.
However a lower activity also reduces the marginal cost, which induces a higher price.
Furthermore, lower travelling costs imply a more responsive demand, which increases the
marginal revenue for the hospital from a reduction in waiting times, inducing a lower
optimal price. Finally, lower travelling costs increase waiting times but increase the utility
of the patients, so that the marginal beneﬁt from a reduction in waiting time for the semi-
altruistic provider can be higher or lower. Whenever the opportunity cost of public funds
o rt h ed e g r e eo fa l t r u i s mi ss u ﬃciently low the optimal price reduces when travelling costs
are smaller.
The eﬀect of variations in the competitive segment λ on optimal prices is generally
indeterminate. Overall, the analysis in this section suggests that whether higher-powered
incentive schemes complements or substitute competition depends on the type of com-
petition. Given that α or γ are not too high, while more competition through a higher
hospitals density makes higher-powered incentive schemes more desirable, more competi-
tion through lower travelling costs makes higher-powered incentive scheme less desirable.
5.3 Does competition improve social welfare?
Consider the policy choice of monopoly versus competition in the hospital market. Since,
for a given waiting time, the patient surplus B (w) is unaﬀected by this choice of market
regime, it is straightforward to see that competition is welfare neutral if the treatment
price is set at the level which maximises social welfare, i.e., p = p∗. In this case, the
eﬀect of competition on equilibrium waiting times will be neutralised by an appropriate
adjustment of p, keeping w∗ = ws. However, in the general case, where p is not necessarily
set at the optimal level,30 the welfare eﬀect of hospital competition is characterised as
follows:
30Indeed, the most frequently used hospital payment system is DRG-pricing, which is close to average












Figure 1: Welfare eﬀects of competition with a large competitive segment.
Proposition 7 Let p∗ and pm be the prices that yield w∗ = ws and wm = ws, respectively.
(i) Assume that the competitive demand segment is large; 1 − λ< t
2n(V −v),i m p l y -
ing w∗ >w m and p∗ >p m. Then there exists a price e p ∈ (pm,p ∗) such that hospital
competition is welfare superior (inferior) if p>(<) e p.
(ii) Assume that the competitive demand segment is small; 1 − λ> t
2n(V −v),i m p l y -
ing w∗ <w m and p∗ <p m. Then there exists a price e e p ∈ (p∗,p m) such that hospital
competition is welfare superior (inferior) if p<(>)e e p.
Whether or not hospital competition improves social welfare depends here on the
characteristics of the reimbursement system (more speciﬁcally, the level of prices p)a n d
the relative size of the competitive demand segment (λ). An increase in the treatment price
always induces hospitals to increase supply and shorten waiting times. An illustration of
the case of 1−λ< t
2n(V −v) is given in Figure 1. The following discussion summarises the
diﬀerent cases:
High price. When the price is suﬃciently high, waiting times in the monopoly equilib-
rium are shorter than the socially optimal level and activity is excessively high (i.e., the
marginal beneﬁt from treating an extra patient is below the marginal cost).
28a) If, in addition, the competitive segment λ is suﬃciently large so that w∗ >w m,
then hospital competition increases waiting times towards the optimal level ws, reducing
activity and increasing welfare (see Figure 1 for p>p ∗).
b) In contrast, if the competitive segment λ is suﬃciently small so that w∗ <w m,
then hospital competition reduces waiting times even further from the optimal level ws,
increasing activity and reducing welfare.
Low price. The opposite analysis holds if the price is suﬃciently low. Then waiting
times in the monopoly equilibrium are longer than the socially optimal level and activity
is excessively low (i.e., the marginal beneﬁt from treating an extra patient is above the
marginal cost).
a) If, in addition, the competitive segment λ is suﬃciently large so that w∗ >w m,t h e n
hospital competition increases waiting times further from the optimal level ws, reducing
activity and reducing welfare (see Figure 1 for p<p m).
b) In contrast, if the competitive segment λ is suﬃciently small so that w∗ <w m,
then hospital competition reduces waiting times towards the optimal level ws,i n c r e a s i n g
activity and increasing welfare.
Suppose that we start by a situation where waiting times are excessively high and
prices too low. For example, until a few years ago in the UK hospitals were paid with
ﬁxed budgets (p =0 ). Similarly, in Norway in 1997 only 30% of the revenues were based
on tariﬀs. In both countries waiting times are considered a major policy concern and are at
least perceived as too high. Our analysis suggests that policies that encourage competition
will have the expected eﬀect only if the competitive demand segment is suﬃciently low.
It is only in this case that competition will reduce waiting times, increase activity and
increase welfare.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we extend our analysis in two directions. First, we allow for a fee, or
more precisely, a copayment associated with hospital treatment. Second, we perform a
29welfare analysis assuming that the regulator might put a stronger weight on poor patients.
Redistribution is a relevant concern in hospital treatment.
6.1 Introducing a charge (copayment)
The model so far has assumed that patients receive treatment free of charge. Suppose that
on top of receiving a payment p from the government, hospitals can also charge a small
fee f. The results obtained in sections 2-4 are mainly unchanged. Suppose that patients
have income m, and that utility is separable between income and beneﬁtf r o mt r e a t m e n t ,
so that the utility of an H-type (resp. L-type) patient who is located at x and seeking
treatment at hospital i, located at zi,i sg i v e nb y
UH (x,zi)=V − t|x − zi| − wi + u(m − f), (45)
UL (x,zi)=v − t|x − zi| − wi + u(m − f). (46)
We can show that by redeﬁning
V 0 = V + u(m − f); v0 = v + u(m − f); p0 = p − f (47)
the model is analytically equivalent to the one presented above. More precisely, the equi-
librium waiting time is given by (13) and (14), where V,v and p are substituted with V 0,v0
and p0. Similarly, for the comparative statics of waiting time with respect to t, λ and n
(Section 4.2). Also Proposition 2 regarding the eﬀect of introducing competition remains
identical. This is because
¡
V 0 − v0¢
= V + u(m − f) − v − u(m − f)=( V − v).
More insightful is the eﬀect of the introduction of a charge on welfare. The surplus to










(v + u(m − f) − w − tx)dx, (48)
where the ﬁrst term is the surplus to H-type patients, and the second term is the surplus
to the L-type patients. Diﬀerentiating with respect to the charge f we obtain
∂B(w,f)
∂f
= −um(·)X (w,f) < 0.
Using the same deﬁnition of social welfare as in the previous analysis, welfare at the
hospital level is given by
W (w)=B (w)+T +( p + f)X (w) − C (X (w)) − F − (1 + γ)[pX (w)+T]. (49)
Assuming that the regulator sets the price so as to induce the socially optimal waiting
time, ws, and assuming, as before, that the lump-sum transfer T is set such that the
hospital’s limited liability constraint is binding, social welfare is given by
W (ws(f),f)=B (ws(f),f)−(1 + γ)[C (X(ws(f),f)) + F]+f (1 + γ)X(ws(f),f). (50)
We want to determine the welfare eﬀect of an increase in the charge f. Applying the
Envelope Theorem, we ignore the indirect eﬀects of the fee on waiting time, and focus
only on the direct eﬀects. Therefore,
∂W (ws(f),f)
∂f
= −um(·)Xs − (1 + γ)C0 (Xs)
∂Xs
∂f














31From (51) we can identify four eﬀects: (i) a higher fee reduces consumer surplus, and
welfare (ﬁrst term); (ii) a higher fee reduces demand, which reduces the marginal cost,
which increases welfare (second term); (iii) a higher fee reduces the need of distortionary
taxation and therefore increases welfare (third term); however (iv) a higher fee reduces
demand, which reduces the beneﬁts from lower distortionary taxation (fourth term).
Applying the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to a socially optimal waiting time, (32),
















2n(1 − λ)fum (·)
tλ +2 n(1 − λ)[v − ws + u(·)]
. (54)
Two results can be straightforwardly obtained, which are summarised in the ﬁnal propo-
sition of the paper:







(ii) Increasing the charge is welfare increasing if demand is inelastic:  X
f < 1.
For hospital care, the empirical evidence normally suggests that the elasticity is well
below one. For example, evidence from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment suggests
that a higher fee reduces demand by 0.2% (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1993).
6.2 Inequality aversion
The welfare function used so far is utilitarian as the two types of patients have the same
weight. High beneﬁt patients always get treated in our model. Therefore, inequality
aversion in this model implies a higher weight for patients with low beneﬁt. Deﬁne β>1
























(v − w) < 0. (56)
Ah i g h e rw e i g h tβ implies that the marginal social cost of waiting is higher, which reduces












i < 0. (57)
A lower waiting time, in turn, implies a higher price p if the degree of altruism or the
opportunity cost of public funds is suﬃciently low. The main results of the analysis are
unchanged.
7 Conclusions and policy implications
This study has analysed the impact of hospital competition on waiting times, using a
Salop-type model. Our main result is that, compared with a benchmark case of local
monopolies, hospital competition reduces waiting times only if the competitive demand
segment is suﬃciently small. Otherwise, if free choice is relevant for a suﬃciently large
share of the total patient mass (i.e., if the competitive segment is suﬃciently large), then
competition increases waiting times. Therefore we suggest that policies that encourage
choice and competition in health care markets may not be as successful as policymakers
might expect. The intuition for this ambiguous result is that, on the one hand, free patient
choice induces hospitals to "compete" to avoid treating unproﬁtable patients, while, on
31Notice that, with this reformulation of the social welfare function, the second-order condition for an






33the other hand, free patient choice also induces semi-altruistic providers to compete to
attract high-beneﬁtp a t i e n t s .T h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates when the competitive segment is
suﬃciently large.
We also ﬁnd that policies aimed at reducing travelling costs (like reimbursing travel
expenses for patients choosing to receive treatment in hospitals outside their catchment
area) may surprisingly increase waiting times and reduce overall activity. The reason
stems from the fact that reducing travelling costs makes the demand for treatment more
elastic, making waiting times a more eﬀective rationing tool.
According to our analysis, policies aimed at increasing hospital density will have the
expected eﬀect of reducing waiting times and increasing activity. For example, in countries
like Denmark, the UK and Spain, governments have decided to contract out patients to
existing private hospitals. This policy can be seen as eﬀectively increasing the density of
hospitals by opening the patients from the public waiting list to private providers. Since
demand in each hospital is lower and the marginal cost less steep, providers will respond
by increasing activity and reducing waiting times.
Many countries increasingly remunerate hospitals according to activity-based funding
rules (like DRG pricing in Norway and other European countries or HRG pricing in the
UK) where hospitals receive a price for each patient treated. Our analysis suggests that
for countries where waiting times are excessively low and prices are too high, hospital
competition is socially preferable to monopoly if the competitive demand segment is suf-
ﬁciently large. In this case, competition will increase waiting time towards the optimal
level, reducing activity and increasing welfare.
In contrast, for countries (like perhaps the UK, Finland or Norway) where waiting times
are excessively high and prices too low, competition will reduce waiting times, increase
activity and increase welfare only if the competitive demand segment is suﬃciently small.
Finally, we show that whether higher-powered incentive schemes complements or sub-
stitute competition depends on the type of competition. While more competition through
a higher hospitals density makes higher-powered incentive schemes more desirable, more
34competition through lower travelling costs makes higher-powered incentive scheme less
desirable.
Appendix A. Adjustment of waiting times to steady state.
Denote yi(t) as the waiting list at time t in hospital i. At any point in time the waiting




i (wi(t),w j(t)) − XS
i (t) (A1)
The waiting time is given by the number of periods that each patient has to wait before
her/his turn arrives, i.e., before all the patients on the current waiting list are treated.




i (τ)dτ = yi(t). (A2)















i (wi(t),w j(t)) − XS
i (t + wi(t))
XS
i (t + wi(t))
. (A3)
The waiting time increases (decreases) if the demand at time t is higher (lower) than the
supply at time t + w.
We focus on the steady state solution, so that the waiting list, waiting time, supply










i ((t + wi(t)) = XS
i ,X D
i ((wi(t),w j(t)) = XD
i (wi,w j).
In the steady state, ∂wi
∂t =0 , and (A3) implies XD
i (wi,w j)=XS
i , while the waiting list
equation (A1) simpliﬁes to XS
i wi = yi. This last expression can be written intuitively
as wi = yi/XS
i . In the steady state, the waiting time is given by the ratio between the
waiting list and supply: the waiting time is given by the number of periods to clear the
waiting list. In the model derived in the paper, the waiting list yi does not play any role
and it is therefore suppressed.
Appendix B. Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by conﬁrming the last part of the Proposition. By total










t − α λ
2t
i < 0
An interior solution with positive equilibrium waiting times requires that the fol-





.A s s u m e xL =0 ,w h i c h
implies X (w∗)=λ





















Denote the price that solves this equation by p.S i n c e∂w∗/∂p < 0 and ∂xL/∂w < 0
we know that xL > 0 if p>p .N o w a s s u m e xL = 1






















∆ . Notice that ∂
2πi/∂wi∂p = ∂









































Denote the price that solves this equation by p1. Again, since ∂w∗/∂p < 0 and
∂xL/∂w < 0 we know that xL < 1
2n if p<p1. Finally, assume w∗ =0 , which implies
X (0) = 2(1 − λ) v
t + λ

































, it is straightforward to see that p < min{p1,p2},
implying that S is non-empty, if α is suﬃciently small. Q.E.D.




C0 (Xi (w∗)) − C0 (Xi (wm))
¤
− 2(wm − w∗)=λ
2(1− λ)n(V − v) − t
n(1 − λ)(2− λ)
.
Let us ﬁrst conﬁrm that the left-hand side (LHS) of this equation is monotonic in
wm and w∗. Using (5) and (15), we have that ∂ (LHS)/∂w∗ = − 2
αC00 (Xi) 2−λ
t +2
and ∂ (LHS)/∂wm = 2
αC00 (Xi)
2(1−λ)
t − 2. Applying the second-order conditions,
it is straightforward to verify that ∂ (LHS)/∂w∗ < 0 and ∂ (LHS)/∂wm > 0.
Since LHS =0if w∗ = wm, it follows that w∗ > (<)wm if the right-hand side
of the equation is negative (positive), which is the case if 1 − λ<(>) t
2n(V −v).
Since (14) and (20) are identical for a given waiting time, wm <w ∗ implies that
Xi (wm) >X i (w∗) and vice versa. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . First, xL =0implies X (ws)=λ





2n(1−λ)(1+γ) for xL > 0. Second, xL = 1
2n implies X (ws)= 1
n.W e s e e




2n(1−λ)(1+γ) for xL < 1
2n.T h i r d , ws =0implies X (0) =
2(1− λ) v
t + λ












follows that ws > 0 implies xL < 1
2n, making the condition for xL < 1
2n redundant.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We know (Proposition 1) that ∂w∗/∂p < 0, and it is straight-
forward to show that this also holds under monopoly, i.e., ∂wm/∂p < 0.( i ) F r o m
Proposition 2 we know that, if 1 − λ< t
2n(V −v), w∗ >w m for all p, implying that
pm <p ∗. This means that, from a social welfare perspective, waiting time is too long
in both regimes if p<p m and too short in both regimes if p>p ∗.S i n c ew∗ >w m
for all p, it follows that competition is always welfare superior if p>p ∗,w h i l ea
monopoly regime is always welfare superior if p<p m.F o r p ∈ (pm,p ∗), replacing
monopoly with competition means going from a regime with too short waiting to
a regime with too long waiting times in equilibrium. Since W is single-peaked in
p, there exists a unique price e p ∈ (pm,p ∗) such that competition is welfare superior
(inferior) if p>(<) e p.( i i )B yt h ei n v e r s ea r g u m e n tw ec a nd e ﬁne an equivalent price
e e p for the case of 1 − λ> t
2n(V −v). Q.E.D.
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